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COMMENT
The Rise and Fall of Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress in North Carolina
INTRODUCTION
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) has
developed slowly in the law, and only recently have courts recognized
a cause of action for bystanders.' Negligently caused emotional dis-
tress must be distinguished from emotional distress intentionally or
recklessly caused, for which bystanders have long been compensated.
Courts traditionally have placed strict limits on recovery for mental
injury because of reluctance to compensate a harm that may be tem-
porary or relatively trivial, fear of fraudulent claims, and the percep-
tion that an unfair burden would be placed on defendants for
consequences that are disproportionate and remote from the negli-
gent act.3
This article will give an overview of the various approaches devised
by the American courts to address the problems raised by claims of
emotional distress. It will then track the development of the tort in
North Carolina, including recent supreme court cases that attempt to
define the limits of foreseeability. The article will show that the court
has established strict requirements, while at the same time asserting
that there are no rigid tests for recovery. The law of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress is not settled in North Carolina; the purpose
1. As used in this article, "bystander" means a person who was not directly injured by the
negligent conduct, but who suffered emotional distress as a result of observing an injury to a
third person. The typical circumstance is a person who observes a horrific car crash, is not per-
sonally injured, but suffers severe mental disturbance as a result of the experience.
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress arises when the defendant intentionally or
recklessly engages in extreme and outrageous conduct that causes severe emotional distress to
another. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). The Restatement formulation
includes liability to a limited class of bystanders:
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he inten-
tionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or
not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
Id., § 46(2).
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TiE LAW OF TORTS § 54 at 360-61
(5th ed., 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965).
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of this article is to provide a framework from which the response of
the courts to claims of NIED may be predicted.
STANDARDS FOR RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
(PRELUDE)
American courts have devised five basic approaches to address their
concerns with emotional injury and bystander recovery.
1. The No Recovery Rule.
Alabama is perhaps the only remaining state that does not recog-
nize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.' In
Gideon v. Norfolk Southern Corp.,5 a railroad train struck the vehicle
in which a child was riding, throwing him out of the car. The child's
mother was following in a separate car and witnessed the accident,
could see her child lying on the ground, but could not reach him until
the train had passed. The woman suffered severe emotional distress
as a result of witnessing the death of her child. In affirming the trial
court's dismissal of the mother's action, the Alabama Supreme Court
stated, "We again reject the argument that we should recognize a
cause of action that would allow one to recover damages for emo-
tional distress caused by another's mere neglect. Even if we did rec-
ognize such a cause of action, we would not extend it to bystanders."6
The question of bystander recovery aside, a rule that fails to recog-
nize emotional injury is unduly harsh. Legitimate concerns with es-
tablishing monetary damages for emotional injury, eliminating
fraudulent claims, and controlling a flood of litigation must be bal-
anced with the individual's interest in having legal recourse for real
injury. Courts universally compensate victims with physical injuries
for pain and suffering. "Mental suffering is no more difficult to esti-
mate in financial terms, and no less a real injury, than 'physical' pain
.... [I]t must be asked whether fairness will permit leaving the bur-
den of loss instead upon the innocent victim."7
2. The Separate Protected Interest.
The earliest cases permitting recovery for emotional distress im-
posed liability on defendants who, in addition to the tortious conduct,
had assumed a separate legal duty. In Young v. Western Union Tel.
4. See generally 38 Am. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock and Mental Disturbance § 13 (1968); P.G.
Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, or
Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R. 3d 1337 (1970).
5. 633 So.2d 453 (Ala. 1994).
6. Id at 454.
7. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, at 360-361.
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Co.,8 the plaintiff's mental anguish caused by the negligent failure to
deliver a telegram was held to be compensable. The court stated,
"The company's employment is of a public character, and it owes the
duty of care and good faith to both sender and receiver."9 Similarly,
courts have permitted recovery for emotional distress caused by the
mishandling of corpses. In North Carolina, courts have recognized a
possessory interest in dead bodies for the purpose of burial,1° and re-
covery in tort has been allowed when emotional distress is caused by
the negligent interference with this quasi-property right."
Some courts require the presence of a separate legal relationship
when the emotional distress is unaccompanied by physical injury. In
Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Center,'2 the defendant's
negligent response to plaintiff's call to the 911 emergency service
caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff whose husband was
suffering a heart attack. The court stated, "Although foreseeability is
a prerequisite to liability, plaintiff must first point to some 'legally pro-
tected interest' of hers that defendants violated."' 3 The court held
that a breach of contract does not support purely emotional injury,
and plaintiff could show no other legal source to support her NIED
claim.'
4
Claims for NIED are often associated with medical malpractice
claims. In Burgess v. Gupta,'5 a woman was allowed to recover for
emotional distress caused by a doctor's negligent injury to her baby
during delivery. The court held that by entering into the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, the doctor assumed a duty of care towards the
mother, and that the mother was a direct victim of the negligence.' 6
In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc. ,'17 a case with
similar facts, the court held that emotional distress of expectant par-
8. 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
9. Id. at 372-73, 11 S.E. at 1044.
10. CiALES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 16.64.3
(1991) [hereinafter DAYE & MORRIS].
11. Id
12. 816 P.2d 593 (Or. 1991).
13. Id. at 597.
14. Id. at 597. Although a 911 emergency service occupies a similar position relative to the
public as a telegraph company, this court did not find the defendant owed a duty of care to the
caller, contrary to the court in Young. See also Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1993)
("Mental anguish damages should be compensated only in-connection with defendant's breach
of some other duty imposed by law.").
15. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
16. Id. The court, in dicta, stated that the doctor did not assume a duty towards the father
of the child, since there was no doctor-patient relationship with the father. To recover, the court
suggested that the father would have to meet the requirements of the bystander rule, since he
was not a direct victim of the negligence. Id. at 1204, n.8.
17. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
1995]
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ents caused by concern for the fetus was reasonably foreseeable to the
treating physician, and thus compensable. 18
3. The Impact Rule.
Concern for the genuineness of mental anguish claims has caused
some courts to deny recovery unless there has been a physical impact
on the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence.' 9 This rule is
similar to the separate legal interest rule in that the court allows re-
covery only when there has been an invasion of the plaintiff's interest
in freedom from offensive bodily contact. The impact required to sat-
isfy this rule has sometimes been interpreted so leniently that no ac-
tual physical injury resulted. In one recent case the court found
sufficient impact where the plaintiff was "jostled" when his car ran
over the body of a person, which was lying in the road as a result of
the defendant's negligence.2 °
Strict application of the impact rule can produce inequitable results.
A plaintiff who has suffered severe emotional distress but no impact is
denied recovery, while a plaintiff who can show impact, no matter
how slight, is compensated. Only a minority of jurisdictions now re-
quire an impact to recover for emotional distress.2'
4. The Zone of Danger Rule.
The zone of danger rule was first enunciated in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R.22 The rule limits the duty of the defendant to those peo-
ple within the zone of danger created by his actions. If a person is not
within the area of physical risk, his injuries are not foreseeable to the
defendant, and no liability attaches. As applied to emotional distress,
the zone of danger rule requires that the plaintiff (1) be within zone of
physical danger created by the defendant's actions, and (2) as a result,
fear for his or her own safety.23
While not requiring physical impact, the courts that apply this rule
limit the extent of the zone of danger to include only those people
who are threatened with physical harm.24 The rule suffers from some
18. l, at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
19. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, at 363-65.
20. Stoddard v. Davidson, 513 A.2d 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
21. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, at 364.
22. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
23. Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2).
24. See Zea v. Kolb, 613 N.Y.S.2d 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (denying recovery because
plaintiff was never threatened with bodily harm); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512
N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987) (denying recovery to parents for emotional distress caused by defendant's
negligence resulting in the development of hemophilia in their child, since parents were never
endangered by the negligence).
4
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of the same line-drawing problems as the impact rule. A plaintiff who
witnesses a gruesome accident but is not physically threatened may
suffer severe mental anguish without compensation, while another
person only a few feet closer to the accident is permitted to recover
for an otherwise identical injury. The zone of danger rule recognizes
only emotional injuries caused by a concern for one's own safety;
common experience teaches that emotional injuries often occur by
witnessing traumatic events affecting others.2 5
5. The Bystander Rule.
Under the impact rule and the zone of danger rule, the plaintiff is a
direct victim of the defendant's negligence. In contrast, the bystander
rule focuses on the indirect effect on the plaintiff resulting from an
injury to a third person. The first case to recognize a cause of action
for a person not within the zone of danger was Dillon v. Legg.26 In
Dillon, a woman witnessed an accident in which her child was run
over and killed. The woman was never in physical danger and did not
fear for her own safety. The court rejected the zone of danger rule,
and held that a defendant is liable for emotional distress that was the
foreseeable consequence of his negligence: "The chief element in de-
termining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff
is the foreseeability of the risk...."27 The court offered "guidelines"
for courts to take into account in determining foreseeability:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the
shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as con-
trasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree
of the defendant's foreseeability .... 28
25. In rejecting the zone of danger rule as applied by the majority of courts, the California
Supreme Court stated:
The concept of the zone of danger cannot properly be restricted to the area of those ex-
posed to physical injury; it must encompass the area of those exposed to emotional injury.
The courts, today, hold that no distinction can be drawn between physical injury and emo-
tional injury flowing from the physical injury; indeed, in the light of modern medical knowl-
edge, any such distinction would be indefensible. As a result, in awarding recovery for
emotional shock upon witnessing another's injury or death, we cannot draw a line between
the plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of physical impact and the plaintiff who is in the
zone of danger of emotional impact. The recovery of the one... is as much compelled as
that of the other.
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920, n.5 (Cal. 1968).
26. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
27. Id. at 920.
28. Id.
1995]
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Under the pure bystander rule, foreseeability of the resultant emo-
tional injury is the only requirement. Foreseeability does not afford a
bright line test, and NIED claims must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.2 9  The difficulty of applying the pure bystander rule has
caused some courts to reject it30 and others to impose limitations on
its application to insure that the emotional distress is genuine and to
lessen the danger of a flood of litigation.31
Additional restrictions on recovery.
The class of plaintiffs who may recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress expands as a jurisdiction moves from the impact
rule to the zone of danger rule and finally to the bystander rule. A
jurisdiction that uses the zone of danger rule will most likely find that
a plaintiff who suffered an impact as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence was within the zone of danger, and recovery will be allowed for
some plaintiffs who did not have an impact. Similarly, a jurisdiction
that has adopted the bystander rule will permit recovery for any plain-
tiff within the zone of danger and others who were not within the zone
of physical harm.
Courts often impose further limitations on the ability of a plaintiff
to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In jurisdic-
tions that use the zone of danger rule, additional limitations are gener-
ally absolute requirements for recovery. Jurisdictions that have
adopted the bystander rule are split: some make the limitations a re-
quirement, while others consider them "factors" or "guidelines" to be
used in establishing foreseeability.
A) PHYSICAL MANIFESTATION. Many jurisdictions require that the
plaintiff manifest some physical injury or symptom of the mental
anguish.32 The requirement of a physical manifestation assures that
29. This was recognized by the Dillon court: "All these elements, of course, shade into each
other; the fixing of obligation, intimately tied into the facts, depends upon each case." Il at 921.
30. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987).
31. The California Supreme Court itself, after two decades of experience under the Dillon
test, restricted recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress by making the "guidelines"
absolute elements of the claim:
[T]he societal benefits of certainty in the law, as well as traditional concepts of tort law,
dictate limitation of bystander recovery of damages for emotional distress. In the absence
of physical injury or impact to the plaintiff himself, damages for emotional distress should
be recoverable only if the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at
the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is
causing injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which
would be anticipated in a disinterested witness.
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
32. The traditional rule is expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965):
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily
harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance
6
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the claim of emotional distress is genuine 33 and may be used to limit
the class of potential plaintiffs. The Rhode Island Supreme Court suc-
cinctly stated the public policy reasons for requiring a physical
manifestation:
[W]hen we established that the existence of physical symptomatology
was a prerequisite to stating a valid claim to recover for emotional
distress, we sought to guarantee the genuineness of a plaintiff's claim
as well as to limit the scope of possible claims so that they will bear a
reasonable relation to the defendant's culpability. 34
B) RELATIONSHIP TO THE VICTIM. Severe emotional distress may
be expected when a person witnesses a severe injury to another with
whom he has a close relationship. Some courts define the necessary
relationship,35 some require a close family relationship,36 while other
jurisdictions recognize a sufficiently close relationship may exist even
if the plaintiff and the victim are not married or within the same im-
mediate family.37
c) SEVERITY OF THE INJURY TO THE VICTIM. A few courts require
that the direct victim of the defendant's negligence be severely injured
or killed.38 As one court expressed, "The direct victim of the trau-
matic injury must suffer such harm that it can reasonably be expected
that one in the plaintiff's position would suffer serious mental anguish
from the experience. ' 39 This is an objective standard, addressing the
foreseeability of the emotional injury.'
alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such
emotional disturbance.
33. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3 at 363.
34. Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 1994).
35. See, e.g., Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 434-35 (Wis. 1994)
("the victim and the plaintiff must be related as spouses, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild or
siblings.").
36. Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993) (limiting recovery for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress to immediate family member within the zone of danger); Nugent v.
Bauermeister, 489 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing recovery only for immediate
family member who observed negligently inflicted injury may recover). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3) and cmt. f (1965).
37. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (allowing recovery for a person who cohab-
ited with and was engaged to marry the decedent). See also Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556
So.2d 559 (La. 1990): "The test (for recovery) should not be blood or marriage, but rather
whether the judge or jury is convinced from all the facts that there existed such a rapport be-
tween the victim and the one suffering shock as to make the causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the shock understandable." Id. at 570 (quoting 12 F. STONE, Louisl-
ANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE TORT DOcrRINE § 170 (1977)).
38. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Cenex-Land O'Lakes Agronomy Co., 513 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Neb.
1994) (permitting recovery only if "the foreseeable harm to the plaintiff arose from the death or
serious injury of the victim.").
39. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So.2d 559, 570 (La. 1990).
40. See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 444 (Wis. 1994) ("A
fatal injury or a physical injury that a reasonable person would view as serious can be expected
7
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D) CONTEMPORANEOUS OBSERVATION. Courts are split as to
whether the plaintiff must observe the negligent act. This requirement
is implicit in the zone of danger test; the plaintiff must fear for his own
safety, which is an impossibility unless the plaintiff observes the negli-
gent act.4' A typical statement of the requirement is that recovery is
limited to the plaintiff who "is present at the scene of the injury-pro-
ducing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing
injury to the victim .... ,42 Some courts take a broader perspective,
reluctant to draw the line between one who observes the injury and
one who arrives on the scene shortly thereafter.43 One court even
allowed recovery when the plaintiff never saw the accident scene or
the victim but learned about the death of her son later.4
E) SEVERITY OF THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. Every jurisdiction
limits recovery to only those plaintiffs who have suffered severe emo-
tional distress, a concept borrowed from the related tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.45 The policy for this requirement is
expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as:
It is only where [the emotional distress] is extreme that the liability
arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this
world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a
part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only
to cause severe distress to a bystander. Less serious physical harm to a victim would not ordina-
rily result in severe emotional distress to a reasonable bystander of average sensitivity.").
41. "Observation" in most situations will be through the sense of sight. However, there is
no reason a plaintiff should be denied recovery when he becomes aware of a severe injury to
another through his other senses, for instance, by hearing the screech of tires followed by a
violent impact.
42. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
43. The Wyoming Supreme Court, adopting this view, stated:
The essence of the tort is the shock caused by the perception of an especially horrendous
event.... The kind of shock the tort requires is the result of the immediate aftermath of an
accident. It may be the crushed body, the bleeding, the cries of pain, and in some cases, the
dying words which are really a continuation of the event. The immediate aftermath may be
more shocking that the actual impact. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff can recover if he
observed the infliction of serious bodily harm or death, or if he observed the serious bodily
harm or death shortly after its occurrence but without material change in the condition and
location of the victim.
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986). See also Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp.,
556 So.2d 559, 570 (La. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff must either "view the accident or injury-
causing event or come upon the accident scene soon thereafter and before substantial change
has occurred in the victim's condition.").
44. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures, 108 N.C. App. 668,424 S.E.2d 676 (1993). This
case was reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court on this issue. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospi-
tality Ventures, 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993). See infra text accompanying note 109. In a
case involving a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a court permitted recovery
for emotional injury when the plaintiff learned more than a day after an automobile accident
that the plaintiff had dragged her daughter from the wreckage and left her in a ditch to die; the
plaintiff never saw the scene where the body was found. Nichols v. Busse, 503 N.W.2d 173 (Neb.
1993).
45. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994).
8
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where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could
be expected to endure it.
4 6
In contrast to the "thin-skull" rule applied in other areas of tort law,
courts universally apply an objective standard when measuring the se-
verity of the emotional injury. In Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of
Maine,47 the court stated, "We do not provide compensation for the
hurt feelings of the supersensitive plaintiff-the eggshell psyche. A
defendant is bound to foresee psychic harm only when such harm rea-
sonably could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive person. 4
The objective standard is an expression of the courts' suspicion of
emotional injury and is the same standard as that used for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.49
The severity of the emotional distress has been defined by some
courts in general terms, such as an "emotional injury that is severe and
debilitating, so much so that a reasonable person, normally consti-
tuted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress
engendered by the circumstances of the case."' 50 Other courts define
the severity of the injury in medical terms: "A non-exhaustive list of
examples of serious emotional distress includes neuroses, psychoses,
chronic depression, phobia and shock."'"
F) HEIGHTENED NEGLIGENCE. In Hammond v. Central Lane
Communications Center,52 the Oregon Supreme Court stated that "[a]
plaintiff may recover for severe emotional distress without accompa-
nying physical injury by showing recklessness or a reduced level of
intent, i.e. 'the intent to do the painful act with knowledge that it will
cause grave distress.' ,,53 In that case, the negligent act was done in
conjunction with a separate responsibility to the plaintiff,5 4 and the
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
47. 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987). In Gammon, the plaintiff found an amputated leg in a bag
which he was told contained the personal effects of his recently deceased father. The court
recognized that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
relying on the rationale of other courts supporting claims for mishandling of corpses: "the excep-
tional vulnerability of the family of recent decedents makes it highly probable that emotional
distress will result from mishandling the body. [Citations omitted]. That high probability is said
to provide sufficient trustworthiness to allay the court's fear of fraudulent claims." Id. at 1285.
48. ld. at 1285.
49. "The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no
liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless
it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
50. McCarty v. City of Cleveland Heights, 583 N.E.2d 981, 982 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
51. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So.2d 559, 570 (La. 1990). See also Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc., 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990).
52. 816 P.2d 593 (Or. 1991).
53. Id. at 598.
54. The plaintiff negligently responded to a call for emergency services. See supra text ac-
companying notes 11-12.
1995]
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court did not make it clear on which basis relief was granted. One
commentator has suggested that the heightened standard of gross,
wanton, or willful negligence used in assessing punitive damages
should be applied to claims for emotional distress.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DIsTRESS IN NORTH CAROLINA
56
(The Rise)
During the long and tortured development of the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, North Carolina courts have applied
many of the rules and policy limitations described above. NIED was a
subject of first impression when considered by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Young v. Western Union TeL Co.57 In Young, the
defendant negligently failed to deliver a telegram to the plaintiff,
which stated: "Come in haste; your wife is at the point of death." The
plaintiff suffered severe mental anguish because he was unable to be
with his wife during her last days and missed her funeral. The court
analogized the injury from emotional distress to the injury recognized
in the compensable torts of slander, libel, breach of promise to marry,
malicious arrest and false imprisonment, in all of which "injury to the
feelings be an element to the actual damages.""8  After a review of
decisions in other jurisdictions, the court concluded that a plaintiff
may recover in tort59 for mental pain and anguish in the absence of
physical injury.60 In dicta, the court implied that in a proper case,
punitive damages would be available for emotional distress suffered as
a result of gross negligence.6 In the absence of an allegation of mal-
ice, the court held that damages may be awarded "as compensation to
55. Tracy L. Hamrick, A Clear Judicial Day in North Carolina - Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics
Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1714, 1735-36 (1991).
56. The development of negligent infliction of emotional distress as a cognizable claim in
North Carolina was recounted, if somewhat selectively, in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and
Gynecology Assoc., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990), and was developed fully in law review
articles commenting on Ruark. See, e.g., Tracy L. Hamrick, A Clear Judicial Day in North
Carolina - Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1714 (1991); Julie K. Sandine, The Wavering
Line in Invisible Ink: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in North Carolina - Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, 26 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 741 (1991). Only a
minimal outline of the history of the tort prior to Ruark will be given in this article.
57. 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
58. Id at 375, 11 S.E.2d at 1045.
59. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048. The court also noted that recovery was possible in contract,
apparently on the theory that the person who receives a telegram is the intended third party
beneficiary of the contract between the sender and the telegraph company.
60. Id
61. Id at 386, 11 S.E. at 1049.
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the plaintiff for the wrong he has sustained in the mental anguish
needlessly inflicted on him by the negligence of the defendant."'62
The precursor for the bystander rule was first enunciated in Bailey
v. Long,63 where recovery for negligently caused severe emotional dis-
tress arising from the plaintiff's concern for the welfare of another
was recognized. In Bailey, the plaintiff's wife contracted pneumonia
and died as a result of her confinement as a patient in defendant's
hospital room, which was drafty and leaked water due to defective
construction and maintenance. The court stated,
We see no reason why, if the husband can recover damages from a
telegraph company for mental anguish for delay in delivering a tele-
gram informing him of his wife's illness, he should not recover for the
mental anguish occasioned by witnessing her suffering and death
against the alleged author of such suffering and death.64
Bystander recovery, apparently recognized in Bailey, was denied in
Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co. 61 In its place, the court substituted
the rule that mental anguish is compensable only in conjunction with
an invasion of a separate protected interest. In Hinnant, the plaintiff's
husband was crushed between two railroad cars. The plaintiff did not
witness the accident, but saw her husband later at the hospital and
witnessed his suffering in the hours before his death. The plaintiff
sued for damages for her severe mental anguish and for loss of consor-
tium. The court denied the loss of consortium claim,66 then held that
"if the plaintiff has no cause of action for loss of consortium, she has
none for mental anguish."'67 The court went on to state that as a gen-
eral rule, "mental suffering, unrelated to any other cause of action, is
not alone a sufficient basis for the recovery of substantial damages. '
Physical injury or physical manifestation of emotional distress was
stated to be a prerequisite for recovery in Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores
Corp.,69 where the abusive threats of a debt collector caused a woman
to have a miscarriage. 70 The, court stated:
62. Id.
63. 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916).
64. Id. at 663, 90 S.E. at 810.
65. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). The court stated, "mental anguish is restricted, as a
rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or
sorrow for another's suffering .. " Id. at 129, 126 S.E. at 312.
66. The court held that loss of consortium requires a direct and intentional invasion of the
marital relationship, and was not available in a case involving negligent injury or death of one
spouse. Id. at 128, 126 S.E. at 311.
67. lId, 126 S.E. at 312.
68. Id.
69. 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
70. Although the defendant's conduct in Kirby was intentional, the court stated that recov-
ery was permitted if the injury was either willfully or negligently inflicted. 210 N.C. at 810, 188
S.E at 626. The court relied on the negligence case of Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55
1995]
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As a general rule, damages for mere fright are not recoverable; but
they may be recovered where there is some physical injury attending
the cause of the fright, or, in the absence of physical injury, where the
fright is of such character as to produce some physical or mental im-
pairment directly or naturally resulting from the wrongful act.71
The requirement of a physical injury or physical manifestation ap-
peared to be the settled law72 to the North Carolina Court of Appeals
in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc.7 3 when it stated
that "absent some impact, the emotional distress claimant must mani-
fest some resulting physical injury."'74
No recovery for mental injury was allowed by the court in William-
son v. Bennett75 for a plaintiff who had a particular susceptibility to
mental distress. In Williamson, the plaintiff's brother had recently
been involved in an accident in which a girl on a bicycle was killed.
When a minor accident caused the sound of scraping metal, the plain-
tiff thought she had hit a child on a bicycle, which triggered a neurosis
that resulted in partial paralysis. The court said that the plaintiff's
emotional distress was not foreseeable when the plaintiff had a "more
than ordinary predisposition to neurosis" due partly to the memory of
her brother's earlier accident and partly to the plaintiff's childhood
experiences.76
Whatever confusion may have existed in the case law about negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in bystanders, or the necessity of
showing physical injury to recover, was removed by Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics.77 In Ruark, the plaintiff parents of a stillborn baby alleged
that the negligent diagnosis and treatment of the mother's diabetic
S.E. 778 (1906), where the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress when defendant's negli-
gent blasting at a nearby construction site sent a rock crashing through the roof of the plaintiff's
house, landing near the bed on which she was lying. The Kimberly court stated, "We think the
general principles of the law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from
negligence, whether willful or otherwise, none the less strongly because the physical injury con-
sists of a wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs." 143 N.C. at 404, 55 S.E. at 780.
71. Kirby, 210 N.C. at 812-13, 188 S.E. at 627 (quoting Candler v. Smith, 179 S.E. 395, 399
(Ga. Ct. App. 1935)).
72. See williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), in which, after a review
of the decisional law of North Carolina and other states, the court stated, "It is almost the uni-
versal opinion that recovery may be had for mental or emotional disturbance in ordinary negli-
gence cases where, coincident in time and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress,
some actual physical impact or genuine physical injury also resulted directly from defendant's
negligence." Id at 503, 112 S.E.2d at 52.
73. 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics or
Ruark].
74. Id. at 165, 365 S.E.2d at 916. North Carolina, at least since the 1890 Young decision, has
not used the impact rule. As Williamson and Ruark make clear, however, impact is sufficient to
state a claim for NIED.
75. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
76. Id. at 507, 112 S.E.2d at 54.
77. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990), reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990).
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condition caused the death of the fetus, and that as a result the par-
ents suffered severe emotional distress. In reversing the trial court's
dismissal of the claims, the court of appeals,7" following what it be-
lieved to be the case law requiring physical injury to support a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, held that an injury to a
fetus was an injury to the mother79 and that the forecast of evidence
did not preclude the father from proceeding at trial with proof that he
suffered physical manifestations of his severe emotional distress.8'
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals, but on other grounds. The court returned to the reasoning of
Young and Bailey, expressly overruled Hinnant,s ' and disapproved of
all other cases to the contrary, stating,
[N]either physical impact, a physical injury, nor a subsequent physical
manifestation of emotional distress is an element of the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. Further, a plaintiff may recover
for his or her severe emotional distress arising due to concern for an-
other person, if the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such
severe emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the
defendant's negligence. 82
The Ruark court stated that the elements necessary to establish a
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress are: (1)
negligent conduct by the defendant, (2) reasonable foreseeability that
such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and
(3) severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
conduct.8 3 In addition, the court required that the foreseeable emo-
tional distress be severe:
[M]ere temporary fright, disappointment or regret will not suffice ....
In this context, the term "severe emotional distress" means any emo-
tional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis,
chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling
emotional or mental condition which may be enerally recognized and
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.
78. 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988).
79. Id. at 168, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
80. Id. at 169, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
81. The court stated:
To the extent that it may be read as barring claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress when such claims are unrelated to any other cause of action, or as totally barring
any such claims when based upon emotional distress arising from a plaintiff's concern for
another person's condition, Hinnant failed to follow our settled common law, was erroneous
and is hereby overruled.
327 N.C. 283, 298, 395 S.E.2d 85, 94 (1990).
82. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
83. Id.
84. Id.
19951
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The court suggested three factors to be considered in determining if
the plaintiff's severe emotional distress was foreseeable: (1) the plain-
tiff's proximity to the negligent act, (2) the relationship between the
plaintiff and the person injured by the defendant, and (3) whether the
plaintiff observed the negligent act.85 The court further stated that
foreseeability is fact specific, and must be decided on a case-by-case
basis;' the court intended the "factors" in determining foreseeability
to be neither determinative nor exclusive. s7
The Ruark court stated that foreseeability "should be resolved on a
case-by-case basis by the trial court and, where appropriate, by a
jury."'  However, during the four years following the Ruark decision,
in every case appealed to the court of appeals, the trial courts' dismis-
sals of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were reversed
and remanded to permit a jury to decided the issue of foreseeability.
The first case addressing the extent of foreseeability under the Ruark
formulation was Gardner v. Gardner.9 In Gardner, the defendant's
negligence caused an automobile accident in which his son was seri-
ously injured. The plaintiff mother of the injured child rushed to the
hospital upon learning of the accident, where she saw the rescue
squad arrive and observed resuscitative efforts being applied to her
son. The plaintiff waited in the hospital, and was informed later that
day that her son had died. The only question before the court was
whether the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that his negli-
gence would cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff mother of
the victim.9 In reviewing the elements of the claim and the guidelines
adopted in Ruark, the Gardner court concluded that there was no re-
quirement that plaintiff be in "such close proximity to the injury-pro-
ducing event as to experience a sensory perception of the event."'"
The court held that a parent who sees her seriously injured child soon
after an accident may be expected to suffer severe emotional distress
similar to that of a parent who actually witnessed the accident. 2 Of
the three Ruark foreseeability factors, only the relationship of the
85. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
86. ld. This is substantially the same test for NIED that the California Supreme Court
enunciated in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968). See supra text accompanying notes
26-29.
87. See Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662,666,435 S.E. 2d 324, 327 (1993) (stating in refer-
ence to the Ruark opinion: "Notably, these factors were not termed "elements" of the claim.
They were neither requisites nor exclusive determinants in an assessment of foreseeability . .
88. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
89. 106 N.C. App. 635, 418 S.E.2d 260 (1992), rev'd, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993).
90. For purposes of the appeal, the parties stipulated that their son's death was caused by
the negligence of the defendant, and that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a
result. Id. at 636, 418 S.E.2d at 261.
91. Id. at 638, 418 S.E.2d at 263.
92. Id. at 639, 418 S.E.2d at 263.
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plaintiff to the victim survived Gardner intact. Proximity could in-
clude learning of the negligent act after its occurrence and seeing the
victim in a hospital many miles away from the site of the accident.
Personal observation of the negligent act was completely rejected.
Even the rather loose proximity requirements of Gardner were
eliminated by the court of appeals in Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality
Ventures93 (hereafter Sorrells III). In Sorrells II, the defendant res-
taurant continued to serve alcoholic beverages to the plaintiffs' son
despite knowing he was visibly intoxicated and after being informed
that he would be driving himself home. After leaving the restaurant,
plaintiffs' son was killed in a one-car accident. Plaintiffs did not wit-
ness the accident and never saw their son or his body after the acci-
dent, but upon hearing later that their son's body had been mutilated
in the crash, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish and sued for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The court stated that the trial court
should dismiss negligent infliction of emotional distress claims only if
"the defendant was legally exempt from foreseeing the plaintiff's inju-
ries,"95 and that the trial judge should consider:
whether the injury is reasonably close in both time and location to the
defendant's act, the relationship between the plaintiff and the person
for whom the plaintiff is concerned, whether the plaintiff actually ob-
served the negligent act, whether recovery would place an unreasona-
ble burden upon those engaged in activities similar to that of the
defendant, whether recovery would likely open the way for fraudulent
claims, and whether, in retrospect, it is too highly extraordinary that
the act of the tort-feasor caused the injury. 96
Although the court listed these factors, its analysis was limited to
the facts that the plaintiffs were parents of the victim and that they
learned of the accident "soon" after it occurred. Based on these
93. 108 N.C. App. 668, 424 S.E.2d 676 (1993), rev'd 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993).
94. Sorrells has visited the supreme court twice. Sorrells I was an action for wrongful death
brought by the personal representative of the decedent's estate. The supreme court ruled that
the decedent's contributory negligence in driving while intoxicated barred recovery for wrongful
death. 332 N.C. 645, 423 S.E.2d 72 (1992), reversing the decision of the court of appeals, 105
N.C. App. 705, 414 S.E.2d 372 (1992). In Sorrells 1M, plaintiffs asserted negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and again the defense asserted contributory negligence as a bar to the action.
On that issue, the court of appeals stated that contributory negligence could be imputed to a
third party only if that party would have been vicariously liable for the actions of the other. In
this case, the parents of the 21 year old victim of the accident would not have been vicariously
liable for damages caused by the negligent driving of their son, and therefore his contributory
negligence in causing the accident could not be imputed to them. 108 N.C. App. 668, 671, 424
S.E.2d 676, 679 (1993). On appeal, the supreme court decided the case based on the foreseeabil-
ity issue; the contributory negligence issue was not addressed by the supreme court. 334 N.C.
669, 674-75, 435 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1993).
95. 108 N.C. App. at 671, 424 S.E.2d at 679.
96. Id. at 671-72, 424 S.E.2d at 679.
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alone, the court concluded that the issue of foreseeability was a ques-
tion for the jury.97
After the court of appeals decisions in Gardner and Sorrells II, the
only apparent requirements necessary to survive a motion to dismiss
were that the plaintiff's severe emotional distress be caused at least in
part by the defendant, and that the plaintiff be related to the victim of
the defendant's negligence. In Andersen v. Baccus,9 s the defendant
swerved to avoid hitting a car that suddenly pulled out in front of her,
and struck the car being driven by the pregnant wife of the plaintiff,
killing her. The plaintiff arrived upon the scene of the accident before
the victim was removed, but did not witness the accident itself. After
stating that it did not believe the Ruark decision was intended to have
such an unlimited effect,' the court of appeals held that the family
relationship between the defendant and the victim alone was sufficient
under the precedent of Sorrells 11 to allow the question of foreseeabil-
ity to go to the jury, although the result is to "effectively... recognize
a cause of action based on negligent infliction of emotional distress in
every instance where a family member learns, after the fact, of the
injury or death of a relative resulting from a negligently caused acci-
dent."'100 Just such results were reached in Hickman v. McKoin,' 0
(where the court of appeals recognized emotional distress claims for
two children who saw their seriously injured mother in the intensive
care unit of a hospital after she was injured in an automobile accident)
and Butz v. Holder'° (where a mother arrived on the scene shortly
after her child was struck and killed while riding a bicycle near their
home).
THE IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON NIED
(THE FALL)
The court of appeals' decision in Sorrells II was the high water mark
for potential plaintiffs claiming emotional distress. The foreseeability
"factors" of Ruark, as interpreted by the court of appeals in Sorrells
II, had only succeeded in limiting the class of potential plaintiffs seek-
ing bystander recovery to all the family members of an injured victim.
Any restriction on the flood of litigation threatened by that decision
97. ld. at 672, 424 S.E.2d at 679-80.
98. 109 N.C. App. 16, 426 S.E.2d 105 (1993), rev'd, 335 N.C. 526, 439 S.E.2d 136 (1994).
99. "We believe that the plaintiff's contention goes beyond the holding of the Ruark Court
.... Nonetheless... we must follow the precedent as currently set forth by this Court and find
that it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on this issue." Andersen, 109
N.C. App. at 25, 426 S.E.2d at 110.
100. Id.
101. 109 N.C. App. 478, 428 S.E.2d 251 (1993), rev'd, 337 N.C. 460, 446 S.E.2d 80 (1994).
102. 112 N.C. App. 116, 434 S.E.2d 862 (1993), rev'd on reh'g, 113 N.C. App. 156, 437 S.E.2d
672 (1993).
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would require the North Carolina Supreme Court to revisit the is-
sue, 10 3 which it did in the companion cases' 4 of Gardner v. Gardner'0 5
and Sorrells v. M. YB. Hospitality Ventures10 6 (Sorrells I). Unlike the
California Supreme Court's response to the problem of a flood of liti-
gation created by the bystander rule, 07 the North Carolina Supreme
Court retained foreseeability as the standard for establishing negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
Under the impact rule and the zone of danger rule, the primary
focus is on the direct victim of the negligent act. The question is
whether the defendant breached a duty owed to the direct victim. If
the answer is yes, then the plaintiff may recover if he meets the
mechanical requirements of having suffered an impact or having been
within the zone of risk of physical injury. Under the bystander rule,
however, there are two separate questions of negligence: (1) did the
defendant breach a duty owed to the direct victim, and if so, (2) did
the defendant breach a separate duty owed to the plaintiff claiming
emotional distress. 108 The first question is seldom a problem (in both
Gardner and Sorrells H the defendants stipulated that they were negli-
gent towards the primary victim); the difficult question is whether the
defendant was negligent towards the emotionally injured plaintiff.
Foreseeability must be addressed in determining both duty and
proximate cause.' °9 A duty of care is owed only to those persons who
the defendant could reasonably foresee would be injured by his con-
duct. This "foreseeable plaintiff" question was addressed by the
supreme court in Sorrells II, where the defendant's negligent act was
serving alcoholic beverages to a clearly intoxicated person, knowing
103. In North Carolina, "[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue,
albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless
it has been overturned by a higher court." In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30,
37 (1989).
104. These were the first two cases to reach the supreme court since the Ruark decision. The
decisions in both cases were announced on October 8, 1993.
105. 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993).
106. 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993).
107. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). See supra note 32.
108. The bifurcation of the negligence questions is illustrated in Sorrells. See supra note 93.
In Sorrells I, the wrongful death action was barred by the contributory negligence of the victim;
wrongful death is an action for the negligently caused injury to the victim, which survives his
death and is brought on his behalf by the estate. In Sorrells II, the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim was allowed to go forward; the emotional injury Was to the parents, who had
an action independent of the injury to their son.
109. The dual application of foreseeability has been expressed as:
[T]he obligation to refrain from ... particular conduct is owed only to those who are
foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards
whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is mea-
sured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, Tam LAW OF TORTS § 18.2
(1956)).
1995]
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that he would be driving himself home. The plaintiffs were the vic-
tim's parents, who were neither present at the time of the negligent
act (serving of alcohol) nor at the scene of the resultant accident.
While specifically rejecting the mechanical application of rigid tests,
and noting that proximity and personal observation were not require-
ments, the court held that the parents were not foreseeable plaintiffs.
Under the facts presented, the court found that "it does not appear
that the defendant had any actual knowledge that the plaintiffs ex-
isted."'1 ° Under the holding in Sorrells II, a bystander is a foreseeable
plaintiff if the defendant has actual knowledge of his existence or con-
structive knowledge of his existence (occurring when the plaintiff is
located in close proximity to or personally observes the act of direct
negligence).
If the person claiming emotional distress is a foreseeable plaintiff,
the second question is one of proximate cause: was the plaintiff's
mental anguish foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the negli-
gent act? This question was addressed in Gardner, in which the plain-
tiff mother of the victim did not observe the accident, although she did
witness resuscitative efforts a short while later at the hospital. Unlike
the defendant in Sorrells II, the defendant in Gardner had specific
knowledge of the existence of the plaintiff; plaintiff and defendant
were the parents of the victim. It was not disputed that the negli-
gently caused death of the victim was the cause-in-fact of the plain-
tiff's emotional distress,"' but "[n]evertheless, absent reasonable
foreseeability, this is not an injury for which defendant is legally ac-
countable." '112 The dispositive question for the court was whether it
was foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer severe emotional dis-
tress as that term was defined in Ruark.1 3 On this issue the court
drew very restrictive boundaries. The court recognized that all par-
ents will suffer mental anguish upon learning of a severe injury to or
the death of their child," 4 but a severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition resulting from injury to the child is not an expected
result of a negligently caused accident." 5 The court held that since
the defendant did not have actual knowledge that the plaintiff was
110. Sorrells I1, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323.
111. For the purpose of the appeal, the parties stipulated that the death of their son was the
result of the defendant's negligence. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 666, 435 S.E.2d at 327.
112. Id. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
113. Id See also supra text accompanying note 84.
114. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 327. The court uses some unfortunate language
in this regard. It is doubtful that many parents would describe the loss of their child as "tempo-
rary disappointment . . . or regret", or to pass off the loss with the phrase "[Plart of living
involves some unhappy and disagreeable emotions .. .
115. Id. at 667-68, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
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susceptible to a severe emotional or mental condition, the severe emo-
tional distress was not foreseeable."16
CURRENT STATUS OF NIED IN NORTH CAROLINA
(THE AFTERMATH)
While only affecting one aspect of negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims, Gardner and Sorrells II have effectively eliminated a
large percentage of potential plaintiffs; the court has made it clear that
a mere familial relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy
foreseeability. Although neither physical injury nor physical manifes-
tation is required, plaintiffs who can show either are substantially
more likely to be compensated. 1 7
Throughout the cases, the supreme court repeats the mantra that
foreseeability cannot be determined by mechanical application of ar-
bitrary rules. 1 8 Despite the court's protestations to the contrary,
however, North Carolina now has essentially a requirement of con-
temporaneous observation of the negligent act. The Gardner court
held:
Given [the plaintiff's] absence from the time and place of the tort and
her failure to show that defendant knew she was susceptible to an
emotional or mental disorder or other severe and disabling emotional
or mental condition as a result of his negligence and its consequences,
we hold that plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable and its
occurrence was too remote from the negligent act itself to hold de-
fendant liable for such consequences. 119
The strong implication is that a closely related person can recover for
emotional distress only if the plaintiff contemporaneously observes
the act of direct negligence, or if the defendant has specific knowledge
of the peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff. 20 The requirement that
the defendant have actual knowledge that his negligence would cause
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc., 110 N.C. App 519, 430 S.E.2d 476 (1993)
(holding that it was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer of a small aircraft that severe
emotional distress would result from injuries sustained by the passengers when the aircraft
crashed due to the pilot's reliance on printed information sent to him by the manufacturer).
118. See Sorrells II, 334 N.C. at 672, 435 S.E.2d at 321; Gardner, 334 N.C. at 666, 435 S.E.2d
at 327; Andersen v. Baccus, 335 N.C. 526, 531, 439 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1994); Hickman v. McKoin,
337 N.C. 460, 462, 446 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1994).
119. 334 N.C. at 667-68, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
120. After Gardner, the court of appeals reheard Butz v. Holder, supra note 101, and re-
versed its earlier holding that permitted parents to recover when they arrived at the scene of the
accident a few minutes after the death of their child, stating:
It appears from this language in Gardner that the Supreme Court has held that in any claim
for NIED, the plaintiff must allege and through a forecast of evidence show that defendant
knew that the plaintiff was subject to an emotional or mental disorder or other severe and
disabling emotional or mental condition to say that the consequences of the alleged
tortfeasor's negligence were reasonably foreseeable.
1995]
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severe emotional distress to the plaintiff is a nearly impossible stan-
dard to meet. In Gardner, the tortfeasor was the plaintiff's hus-
band.121 If a husband cannot foresee that his wife would suffer severe
emotional distress upon seeing her severely injured child, under what
circumstances can a defendant have actual knowledge of particular
susceptibility? Apparently actual knowledge requires that the plain-
tiff has suffered a severe and disabling mental or emotional disorder in
the past, and that the defendant knows about it. The circumstances in
Sorrells II, which are more typical, automatically exclude recovery
under this standard. Given the near impossibility of proving knowl-
edge of susceptibility, the only remaining method for the bystander to
recover is if he contemporaneously observed the injury-producing
conduct.
Although the supreme court discussed the particular knowledge of
the defendant as a factor of foreseeability, the defendant's knowledge
of the plaintiff's susceptibility to emotional distress actually relates to
the standard of care required of the defendant. Under traditional tort
concepts, an actor who has superior knowledge is required to exercise
that knowledge to avoid risk.'2 2 Particular knowledge requires the de-
fendant to exercise a higher standard of care towards the plaintiff. Be-
cause of the bifurcation of the negligent acts relative to the victim and
the plaintiff, conduct that is merely negligent under the higher stan-
dard applicable to the plaintiff may not be negligent to the primary
victim. Conversely, in a situation in which the defendant had knowl-
edge of a plaintiff's susceptibility to severe emotional distress, ordi-
nary negligence to the victim would probably rise to the level of gross,
wilful or wanton negligence,'123 or even intentional conduct 24 relative
Butz v. Holder, 113 N.C. App 156, 159, 437 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1993) (reversing its decision in 112
N.C. App. 116, 434 S.E.2d 862 (1993)).
The author believes the court of appeals misread the Gardner holding and that contemporane-
ous observation of the negligent act is an alternative to actual knowledge of susceptibility in
establishing foreseeability.
121. Although not explicitly stated in the case, it is implied that the plaintiff and defendant
were not living together at the time of the accident that killed their son. Since the child was 13
years old at the time of his death and the parents were not divorced, it can be assumed that the
parents had lived together for a substantial period of time and that the husband, if anyone,
should have been aware of a particular susceptibility to severe emotional distress.
122. "The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an inva-
sion of another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising... (b) such superior
attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the actor himself has."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
123. "Definitions of wilful or wanton conduct generally require that it appear that the de-
fendant (1) had knowledge of existing conditions, and was conscious from such knowledge that
injury will likely or probably result from his conduct, and (2) with reckless indifference to the
consequences, consciously and intentionally does some wrongful act or omits to discharge some
duty which produces the injurious result." 57A AM. JUR. 2D, NEGLIGENCE § 263.
124. For intentional infliction of emotional distress "there is no liability where the plaintiff
has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional, unless it results from a peculiar suscepti-
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to the plaintiff. In essence, the court is requiring a heightened level of
negligence when there is no contemporaneous observation of the neg-
ligent act.
The Ruark court, in listing factors to be considered to determine
foreseeability, distinguished between a plaintiff's proximity to the
negligent act and whether the plaintiff personally observed the negli-
gent act.125 The question arises as to whether a plaintiff who was
physically present at or near the negligent act, but did not perceive the
event through her senses, can recover for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The decisions in Sorrells II and Gardner imply that the
plaintiff must be aware at the time of the negligent act that the welfare
of the victim is endangered: "[b]ecause she was not physically present
at the time of defendant's negligent act, plaintiff was not able to see or
hear or otherwise sense the collision or to perceive immediately the
injuries suffered by her son .. ;126 and, "these plaintiffs did not per-
sonally observe any negligent act attributable to the defendant.' 27
The distinction between proximity and perception may only be useful
in explaining a situation similar to the facts in Ruark. Although the
Ruark plaintiffs alleged that they personally observed the negligent
acts that resulted in the stillbirth of their baby,'2 s the facts reveal that
the fetus died because of a failure by the defendant to diagnose and
treat the mother's diabetic condition. 129 The plaintiffs could not ob-
serve or perceive a failure to diagnose a condition, although the plain-
tiffs were certainly in proximity to the negligent act. In this situation,
the court of appeals' finding that an injury to a fetus is also an injury
to the mother seems a better analysis than to draw a distinction be-
tween proximity and observation.
The Ruark "factors" in determining foreseeability include, but are
not limited to, proximity, relationship to victim, and observation; the
Gardner court added actual knowledge of susceptibility. A further
question is whether there are other factors that could establish a fore-
seeable emotional injury. Apparently there are not. In Hickman v.
McKoin,130 plaintiffs were children of a woman who was seriously in-
jured in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs were told their mother
probably would not survive, and were permitted to see her in the in-
bility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 cmt. j (1965).
125. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
126. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
127. Sorrells II, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323.
128. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98. The allegations of the plaintiffs were taken by
the court to be true in this appeal from the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 98-99.
129. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
130. 337 N.C. 460, 446 S.E.2d 80 (1994).
1995]
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tensive care unit of the hospital shortly after the accident. The court
held that, just as the parent-child relationship standing alone was in-
sufficient to support an NIED claim in Gardner, so was the child-par-
ent relationship in this case. 131 The court further held that, since the
plaintiffs did not witness the accident, "under no state of facts which
might otherwise be proved can plaintiffs establish the necessary ele-
ment of foreseeability,"' 132 and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the action.
Unanswered by Gardner, Sorrells II and their progeny, is what rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the direct victim is required to state
a claim for NIED. Parent-child (Gardner, Sorrells II, and Hickman)
and spousal (Butz) relationships are clearly sufficient. North Carolina
has a strong public policy preference for marriage and the traditional
family. 133 However, the ability to recover for an NIED claim is not
likely to be a factor in a person's decision when considering marriage
or other family matters. The courts should look at the foreseeability
of the injury given the relationship between the persons, and not base
recovery on the plaintiff's choice of lifestyle. Recent governmental
recognition of non-traditional living arrangements,' and decisions in
other jurisdictions' 35 indicate a trend towards acceptance of relation-
ships beyond the immediate family. It is consistent with the North
Carolina courts' "totality of the circumstances" approach to NIED
claims to allow a more distant relationship to be offset by a strong
showing of proximity or a particularly horrific injury to the direct vic-
tim, making severe emotional distress more foreseeable.
Given the bystander rule's bifurcation of the negligent acts, the
question arises as to whether the defendant must be negligent towards
the primary victim. A defendant could be shielded from liability be-
cause the primary victim was contributorily negligent or because the
primary victim assumed the risk of the activity. In Sorrells II, the
court of appeals held that the victim's contributory negligence in an
automobile accident was not imputed to his parents, thereby barring
the NIED claim. 136 Since the court of appeals addressed this issue, it
131. Id. at 464, 446 S.E.2d at 83.
132. Id.
133. As an example of North Carolina's preference for traditional families, a child born out
of wedlock cannot inherit through his or her father unless legitimated. Legitimation may occur
by the subsequent marriage of the mother and father of the child. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-11, 12
(1993). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-70.70 to 70.75 (creating and enabling a Commission on
the Family within the General Assembly).
134. See, e.g., Recognition and Registration of Domestic Partnerships, CARREORO (N.C.)
TowN CODE, Ch. 3, art. 1, § 3-2.1 (adopted May 10, 1994).
135. See supra note 36.
136. See supra note 89.
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may be inferred that primary negligence is required.'37 Assumption
of risk as a defense to the primary negligence might arise if, for exam-
ple, a professional race car driver was injured while racing on a negli-
gently constructed track; it is entirely likely that the driver's wife
could witness a crash and suffer severe emotional distress. Applying
an analysis of contributory negligence similar to that used by the court
in Sorrells I, the NIED claim would belong to the wife who did not
assume the risk of driving on the race track; the driver cannot assume
the risk of emotional distress to his wife, and the wife's claim should
be allowed to proceed. In both contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk, there is an underlying act of primary negligence to the
victim, but the defendant is shielded from liability to the victim by
some conduct of the victim. The victim's conduct, however, does not
shield the defendant from liability to the bystander plaintiff.
The defendant would also not be liable to the primary "victim" if
the "victim" had no damages. The North Carolina courts have never
required that the injury to the primary victim be severe or lethal, as
have other courts.138 By extension, may a plaintiff recover in the ab-
sence of a primary victim, for example, if a plaintiff suffers severe
emotional distress caused when she personally observes an airplane
crash, reasonably believing that her husband was on the plane? In a
recent South Carolina case, a woman who suffered severe emotional
distress when a doctor mistakenly and negligently told her that her
father was dead was permitted to proceed with her action against the
doctor. 139 In that case, however, the court held that the woman was a
direct victim of the doctor's negligence, and she did not have to rely
on a theory of bystander recovery."4 Absent some showing of direct
negligence by the defendant in the airplane example, and given the
recent restrictions on recovery placed by the North Carolina courts, it
is unlikely that the courts would permit such an extension if there
were no damages to the primary victim. To paraphrase Sorrells H11,11
the possibility that (1) the airplane owner's negligence resulting in a
crash, (2) which a ticketed passenger's wife would observe (although
the passenger was not on board), (3) which would in turn cause the
passenger's wife (if he had one) not only to become distraught, but
also to suffer "severe emotional distress" as defined in Ruark, simply
137. If no primary negligence is necessary to support a NIED claim, the court of appeals
should have dismissed the appeal of the contributory negligence claim as irrelevant to plaintiff's
ability to assert NIED.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
139. Strickland v. Madden, 448 S.E.2d 581 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a summary judg-
ment for the defendant and stating that the plaintiff could recover if she proved that her bodily
injury was proximately caused by her emotional trauma).
140. Id.
141. 334 N.C. 669, 674, 435 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1993).
1995]
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is a possibility too remote to permit a finding that it was reasonably
foreseeable.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court has drastically reduced the
class of plaintiffs who can potentially recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress by restricting, as a matter of law, the type of con-
duct that can foreseeably cause severe emotional distress. In the wake
of the court's decisions in Gardner v. Gardner, Sorrells v. M.Y.B.
Hospitality Ventures, and subsequent cases relying on those decisions,
negligent conduct that causes severe emotional distress is foreseeable
to a defendant if:
1) the negligent act causes physical injury to the plaintiff, or the plain-
tiff suffers physical manifestations as a result of the negligently
caused severe emotional distress; or
2) the plaintiff has a close relationship to a third person injured by the
defendant, and the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act
and immediately perceived the danger to the third person; or
3) the plaintiff has a close relationship to a third person injured by the
defendant, and the defendant had actual knowledge of a particular
susceptibility of the plaintiff that would cause the plaintiff to suffer
severe emotional distress upon learning of the injury to the third
person.
Despite the court's statements that there are no mechanistic tests
for foreseeability, it is unlikely that a plaintiff will recover without
meeting the requirements of one of these categories.
JOHN M. LOGSDON
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